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CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. S. 319 
Adopted March 30, 1977 
REPORT RECEIVED 
The following was received: 
To: The General Assembly of the State of South Carolina 
REPORT OF FINDINGS 
of 
ADMINISTRATOR OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
pursuant to 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. S. 319 
adopted March 30, 1977 
TO REQUEST THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS INVESTIGATE 
ANY CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE SOUTH CAROLINA US-
URY STATUTES AND THE CONSUMER PROTECTION 
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(1) To what extent have the South Carolina usury statutes been 
preempted by the Consumer Protection Code? 
(2) What conflicts or confusion exists, if any, with respect to the 
applicability of various statutory provisions relating to money and 
interest? 
I. Terminology and Observations 
Section 1.108(1) of the Consumer Protection Code provides that 
This Act prescribes maximum charges for all creditors, ex-
cept .. . those excluded (Section 1.202), extending consumer 
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credit including ... consumer loans (Section 3.104 ), and dis-
places existing limitations on the powers of those creditors 
based on maximum charges. (Emphasis added) 
A. Terminology 
Before going further it will be helpful to note the import of cer-
tain terminology. 
(1) "Maximum charges" is not synonymous with interest or 
service charge or finance charge. It includes these charges but also 
includes all other charges made as an incident to the extension of 
credit as well as other credit related charges such as insurance pre-
miums, delinquency charges, deferral charges, etc .. 
(2) " . . . All creditors, except . .. those excluded (Section 
1. 202) " 
Section 1.202 excludes from the maximum charge provisions 
of the Code 
(a) loans to government entities; 
(b) loans under public utility or common carrier tariffs to 
the extent that such charges are regulated by a state or federal 
agency; 
(c) loans by pawnbrokers; 
(d) loans by insurance agents and premium service com-
panies to finance premiums; 
1966; 
(e) loans by finance companies licensed under Act 988 of 
(f) loans for agricultural purposes; 
(g) loans to students for educational purposes; and 
(h) loans by credit unions. 
Thus, except as enumerated above, the Code prescribes maximum 
charges for all creditors making consumer loans and preempts all 
prior inconsistent law pertaining thereto. 
(3) " Consumer Loan" is defined in Section 3.104 as follows: 
(A) Except as provided in subsection (B), 'consumer loan' 
is a loan made by a person regularly engaged in the 
business of making loans in which: 
( 1) the debtor is a person other than an organization; 
(2) the debt is incurred primarily for a personal, 
family or household purpose; 
(3) either the debt is payable in installments or a loan 
finance charge is made; 
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( 4) either the principal does not exceed twenty-five 
thousand dollars or the debt is secured by an in-
terest in land. 
(B) 'Consumer loan' does not include a loan primarily 
secured by a first lien which is a purchase money 
security interest in land. (Emphasis added) 
( 4) "Purchase money security interest in land" means a 
security interest 
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the land to secure all 
or part of its price; or 
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incur-
ring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights 
in or the use of land if such value is in fact so used. Section 
1.301(21) 
(5) "Land" is not defined in the Code. 
B. Some observations 
(1) Loans which are not "consumer loans" as defined above 
include 
(a) loans made by a person who is not regularly engaged in 
the business of making loans; 
(b) loans to an "organization" -corporation, trust, estate, 
partnership, cooperative or association [See Section 1.301(11 )]; 
(c) loans made primarily for a commercial or business pur-
pose or use; 
(d) loans (other than real estate loans) over $25,000; and 
(e) first mortgage purchase money real estate loans of any 
amount. 
(2) Real estate loans which may be consumer loans, regard-
less of size, are 
(a) real estate loans (including purchase money loans) pri-
marily secured by other than a first mortgage; and 
(b) first mortgage real estate loans other than purchase 
money loans. 
(3) The terms "consumer loan" and "installment loan" are 
not synonymous. A single payment loan may be a consumer loan 
and an installment loan is not always a consumer loan. 
( 4) A loan is not a consumer loan unless it meets all of the 
criteria set forth in the definition [Section 3.104(1 )]. 
( 5) A first mortgage purchase money real estate loan is not a 
consumer loan even though it meets all of the criteria set forth in 
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subsection (1) of Section 3.104 [because it is specifically excluded 
from the definition in subsection (2)]. 
(6) The maximum charge provisions of the Consumer Protec-
tion Code do not apply to a loan which is excluded by Section 1.202 
even though it is a consumer loan as defined in Section 3.104. 
(7) All consumer loans made by all lenders (except those ex-
cluded by Section 1.202) are subject to the maximum charge provi-
sions of the Consumer Protection Code. 
( 8) The maximum charge provisions of the Consumer Protec-
tion Code do not apply to "commercial loans" but such loan rates 
are affected by Part 6, Article 3 of the Code. (Note the term "com-
mercial loan" does not appear in the Code. It is used in this discus-
sion for simplification and refers to all loans which are not con-
sumer loans and are not excluded by Section 1.202). 
(9) With one exception the parties to a "commercial loan" 
may agree in writing that the loan is subject to the Consumer Pro-
tection Code, in which case the maximum charge provisions of Part 
2 (but not Part 5) of Article 3 of the Code are applicable. The single 
exception is a loan primarily secured by a first lien which is a 
purchase money security interest in land. (See Section 3.601) 
(10) With the same exception as above the parties to a "com-
mercial loan'' of $50,000 or more "may contract for the payment by 
the debtor of any finance or other charge." (See Section 3.605) 
II. Extent of Preemption 
The extent to which the general and special usury laws have been 
preempted by the Consumer Protection Code is as follows: 
(1) Loans which are excluded (by Section 1.202) from the max-
imum charge provisions of the Consumer Protection Code and 
those which are excluded from the Code's application altogether re-
main, of course, subject exclusively to the laws which provided for 
such charges prior to enactment of the Code and, to the extent, are 
not affected by the Code. 
(2) Loans which are "primarily secured by a first lien which is a 
purchase money security interest in land" remain subject ex-
clusively to pre-Code law, regardless of amount or by whom or to 
whom made. Such loans are not affected by the Consumer Protec-
tion Code. 
(3) Except as stated in (1) and (2) herein, all consumer loans are 
subject exclusively to the maximum charge provisions of the Con-
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sumer Protection Code regardless of who makes such loans. To the 
extent that any pre-Code law applied to such consumer loans all 
such pre-Code law is preempted. 
(4) Except as stated in (1) and (2) herein, loans other than con-
sumer loans, of $50,000 or more are exempt from all maximum 
charge limitations-"the parties may contract for payment by the 
debtor of any finance or other charge.'' Thus to the extent that pre-
Code law applied to such "commercial loans'' all such pre-Code 
law is preempted. 
(5) Except as stated in (1) and (2) herein, loans other than con-
sumer loans may be treated as consumer loans and made subject to 
Code provisions by written agreement; in which case the maximum 
charge provisions of Part 2 (but not Part 5) of Article 3 of the Con-
sumer Protection Code will apply. Absent such written agreement 
such loans (of $50,000 or less) remain subject to pre-Code law re-
specting such charges. (Loans over $50,000 are exempt from rate 
and charge limitations). 
(6) All preemptions discussed herein extend only to the extent 
that such pre-Code law provides "limitations on powers ... based on 
maximum charges." [Section 1.108(1)) In no case does the Con-
sumer Protection Code preempt or displace any other powers of 
" ... savings banks, savings and loan associations, or other thrift in-
stitutions or insurance premium service companies . . .. " [Section 
1.108(3)] 
III. Areas of Potential Confusion or Conflict 
The South Carolina Consumer Protection Code is the Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code with certain South Carolina modifications. 
All of the confusion or uncertainty about the Consumer Protection 
Code's application arises out of a major modification respecting 
"commercial" loans and loans secured by real estate. 
Section 3.105 of the Uniform Code provided that a real estate 
loan which would be a consumer loan but for the fact that it is "pri-
marily secured by an interest in land'' is a consumer ioan if the rate 
of loan finance charge contracted for exceeds 10% APR (now 12% 
APR), otherwise it is not a consumer loan and is not subject to the 
Consumer Protection Code. 
The comment under that Uniform Code Section states that 
The purpose of this section is to exclude the ordinary home 
mortgage from all provisions of this Act ... ; however, this Act 
is intended to include as consumer loans high rate loans which 
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are characteristic of the second mortgage small loan business. 
Because the ordinary home mortgage invariably has a loan fi-
nance charge below 10%, the exclusion has been based on the 
amount of the loan finance charge. 
Section 3.605 originally read: "With respect to a loan other than 
a consumer loan or a consumer related loan, the parties may con-
tract for the payment by the debtor of any loan finance charge." 
The comment under this section reads, in part 
... It is impossible to measure how much is too much interest 
with respect to large business transactions. If the limit is set so 
high as to provide adequately for speculative business ven-
tures the limit becomes virtually meaningless for most 
transactions. If it is set at a level close to the top of the range 
for most business transactions, it will preclude loans for ex-
traordinary ventures. 
Thus, under the uniform Code all real estate loans, regardless of 
amount or priority of the mortgage were either consumer loans or 
consumer related loans subject to the 18% Code ceiling or "other 
than consumer loans'' and subject to no ceiling. All loans other 
than consumer loans or consumer related loans, regardless of 
amount or security, were subject to no ceiling. All prior law 
prescribing maximum charges for such loans (except those excluded 
by Section 1.202) were to be repealed. This approach would have re-
moved the potential for conflict and confusion. 
Under the modified South Carolina version, called the Consumer 
Protection Code, a loan "primarily secured by a first lien which is a 
purchase money security interest in land," remains subject ex-
clusively to pre-Code law. This includes the "ordinary home 
mortgage" as well as commercial real estate mortgages, regardless 
of amount. Likewise, loans other than consumer loans, of less than 
$50,000 remain subject to pre-Code law, except where a written 
agreement applies Code provisions. These modifications precluded 
repealing any prior usury law and introduced the potential for con-
flict and confusion. 
The problems which have surfaced have to do mainly with just 
two areas: 
( 1) The phrase "primarily secured by a first lien which is a 







sumer Protection Code. Nor are the terms " primarily secured" or 
"land" defined; and 
(2) Some statutes limiting the types of loans a savings and loan 
association may make and which are not repealed or preempted 
have the effect of restricting rates indirectly. 
With respect to the problem area first mentioned, questions arise 
as to whether loans such as the following are "primarily secured by 
a first lien which is a purchase money security interest in land" : 
(a) a construction loan to build a residence for the borrower on a 
lot already owned by him; 
(b) a loan to buy a mobile home which will be "permanently affix-
ed" to a lot owned by the borrower; 
(c) a second mortgage loan made by a lender who also holds the 
purchase money first mortgage. Which mortgage is the primary 
security for the second loan? 
d) a first mortgage loan to buy a condominium-is this an in-
terest in land? 
e) a first mortgage loan to pay off a purchase money first 
mortgage where additional cash is advanced or no additional cash 
is advanced. For example, owner has large equity in home and 
wishes to refinance and use equity for home improvement or owner 
merely refinances existing balance; 
f) two purchase money loans made by the same lender, one a $10 
loan secured by a first mortgage and the balance of the purchase 
price secured by a second mortgage. Would the answer be different 
if the two loans were made by separate (but related) corporations?; 
g) second mortgage loans made to a new purchaser to enable him 
to buy prior owner's equity and assume his purchase money first 
mortgage to the same lender. 
With respect to the second problem area, Chapter 7, Title 8 of the 
South Carolina Code of Laws (Sections 8-600 through 8-626) apply 
specifically to savings and loan associations. Some provisions 
therein raise some difficult questions. 
Section 8-603 provides that a savings and loan association may 
make "direct reduction of principal loans." The statute does not 
define "direct reduction of principal loans," nor does it indicate 
whether or not such loans are to be secured by real estate or 
whether by a first or second mortgage. It assumes (but does not 
specify) that such loans will be secured by a "mortgage'' of some 
type and class. The section does not prescribe a maximum charge 
9 
but prescribes a method of applying payments to reduction of prin-
cipal, which is to some extent inconsistent with some requirements 
of the Consumer Protection Code. 
Section 8-603.1 provides that: 
No building and loan association may make loans under the 
provisions authorized by law to banks, banking houses or 
other persons conducting business in the nature of a bank or 
banking house, except in the usual way of lending to in-
dividuals, without discount, and showing the evidence of the 
indebtedness of such loans to be by promissory notes or bonds 
secured by mortgages of real estate or other security. 
This section is ambiguous. It can be read as providing that a sav-
ings and loan association may make loans which banks may make 
provided that such loans are made in the usual way of lending to in-
dividuals, without discount, and are evidenced by a note or bond 
and secured by mortgages of real estate or other security. 
If this is the meaning of Section 8-603.1 it would appear to 
authorize a savings and loan association to make consumer loans 
under the Code since such loans are "authorized by law to banks." 
The section can also be read as merely prescribing the manner of 
lending to banks. If that is the meaning of the section, however, why 
does the "Home Improvement Loan Act of 1956" commence with 
the words "Regardless of the provisions of § 8-603.1"? Clearly a 
home improvement loan under "Title 1 FHA'' is not a loan to a 
bank. (See Section 8-603.2). 
The lack of clarity in these sections gives rise to questions which 
cannot be conclusively answered: 
a) Must all loans made by a savings and loan (except a mobile 
home loan) be a "direct reduction of principal loan"?; 
b) Does the term "direct reduction of principal loans" encompass 
consumer loans as defined in the Code?; 
c) Are there consumer loans which would not be "direct reduction 
of principal loans"? If so, which? 
d) If a savings and loan association may make consumer loans 
under the Consumer Protection Code, may such lender disregard 
the inconsistent application of payments provisions of Section 8-603 
in order to comply fully with that Code? 
e) Would a loan in compliance with the Consumer Protection 
Code be made "in the usual way of lending to individuals"? 
IV. Residual Application of Specific Statutes 
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Section 8-4-Fee authorized in lieu of interest. 
This was a "small loan law" for banks. It provided a graduated 
rate ranging from about 21% APR on a loan of $150 to about 59% 
on a loan of $50. Such loans which are consumer loans are now sub-
ject exclusively to the Consumer Protection Code. With respect to 
such loans this section may be regarded as repealed. If a bank 
should make such a loan which is not a consumer loan this section 
would still apply. 
Section 8-233-Interest Rate on Installment Credit Plans 
The first paragraph of this section was the "Installment Loan 
Act." The second paragraph was the "Revolving Loan Act," some-
times called the "bank card" or "credit card" law. 
Both of these acts applied to consumer and "commercial" loans 
alike. The installment loan provision provided a rate of "7% add-
on" (approximately 12-3/4% APR) for loans which were "payable 
in installments." The revolving loan rate was 1-1/2% per month 
(18% APR). To the extent that these sections applied to consumer 
loans they may be regarded as repealed, but lenders may continue 
to make other than consumer loans under these sections. 
Section 8-3-Maximum Interest Rates; Exceptions 
Until 1935 this was "the usury statute." It prescribed the ceiling 
on interest which could be charged "upon any contract arising in 
this State for the hiring, lending or use of money or other com-
modity .... '' It is no longer a ceiling for any credit which is not a 
loan primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money 
security interest in land. ("Commercial" loans under $50,000 may 
be made under the Consumer Protection Code. Such loans over 
$50,000 are exempt from rate ceilings.) Its residual application to 
real estate loans, however, is somewhat problematic, thanks to a 
series of amendments to this section and Section 8-233. 
In 1935 (Act No. 270) the legislature exempted from the usury 
statute loans of $1,000 or less which were payable in installments. 
This Act was known as the Installment Loan Act and is codified as 
Section 8-233. 
In 1962 (Act No. 762) the $1,000 ceiling of the Installment Loan 
Act was raised to $7,500, and the Act was made inapplicable to real 
estate loans. 
In 1966 (Act No. 1042) Section 8-233 was deleted and a new pro-
vision was enacted which had no ceiling and which omitted the real 
estate restriction which had been introduced into the law in 1962. 
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The title of the 1966 Act, however, made reference to loans "secured 
by other than real estate mortgages." 
In 1968 (Act No. 1265 ), Section 8-233 was again deleted in its en-
tirety and a new provision enacted with no ceiling, no real estate ex· 
elusion and no reference to real estate loans in the title. 
In 1973 (Act No. 839) Section 8-3 was amended to provide that 
with respect to "loans secured by first mortgages on real estate" 
(until June 30, 1975)* the parties may contract for 
9% on loans of $1 to $50,000; 
10% on loans of $50,001 to $100,000; 
12% on loans of $100,001 to $500,000; and 
any amount on loans in excess of $500,000. 
*The June 30, 1975 expiration date was extended in 1975 to June 
30, 1977. 
The General Assembly apparently assumed that second 
mortgage loans could be made under the Installment Loan Act 
(Section 8-233) since it is not likely that it was intended to leave sec-
ond mortgage rates at 8% while raising first mortgage rates to 9% , 
10%' 12%0 
It should be noted that the 1962 act excluded all real estate 
loans, without regard to whether they were secured by first or sec-
ond mortgages. Likewise when the real estate loan restriction was 
removed no distinction was made between first and second 
mortgages. If Section 8-233 applied to second mortgages it applied 
equally to first mortgages or so it would seem. 
But if Section 8-233 applied to first mortgage real estate loans 
why was Section 8-3 amended at all? The legislative history does 
not answer this question. One possible explanation, however, may 
be found in a 1968 Attorney General's opinion which stated that: 
... State chartered banks may discount or add on interest 
under Section 8-233 ofthe Code, notwithstanding the fact that 
the loans in question are secured by mortgages on real estate. 
On notes secured by mortgages on real estate, State chartered 
building and loan associations may not discount or add on in-
terest; they are limited to repayment on the direct reduction of 
principal basis which precludes the discounting or adding on 
of interest to such notes. 
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Opinion of the Attorney General written to the Commissioner of 
Banking on April 18, 1968, at page 3. 
A proviso which also appeared in the 1973 amendment to Section 
8-3 provides 
that nothing contained herein shall limit or prohibit the type 
of collateral, rate of interest, charges, fees or prepayment pro-
visions on extensions of credit made pursuant to any other 
statutes of this state. (Emphasis added) 
It is certainly arguable that this proviso expresses an intent to 
preserve the applicability of Section 8-233 to real estate loans made 
by lenders who were permitted to lend under that Act, while in-
creasing the rates in Section 8-3 to the market level for loans made 
by savings and loan associations which, according to the Attorney 
General, could not make loans under Section 8-233. 
Loans which are "primarily secured by a first lien which is a 
purchase money security interest in land," regardless of size and 
whether used to purchase a residence or a factory or whatever, are 
not affected by the enactment of the Consumer Protection Code. All 
such loans are subject to either Section 8-3 or 8-233, unless ex-
empted by one of the provisos in Section 8-3 or by Section 8-8, Sec-
tion 8-604 or Sections 36-601 through 36-603. Whether the controll-
ing statute is Section 8-3 or Section 8-233 depends upon how one in-
terprets the 1968 amendment to Section 8-233 and the subsequent 
amendment to Section 8-3 in 1973. 
In any event it will be observed that this confusion was noi 
caused by enactment of the Consumer Protection Code. It resulted 
from numerous "patchwork" amendments to the general usury 
laws in response to economic pressures which saw real estate loan 
rates increase from the 4%-5% levels of the 1940's and '50's to 
reach and exceed the traditional 7% interest rate ceiling in the 
1960's and '70's. It was this kind of confusing patchwork that the 
Uniform Code sought to eliminate. Indeed, the confusion regarding 
loans "primarily secured by a first lien which is a purchase money 
security interest in land'' was caused by an effort to preserve the ap-
plication of these usury statutes to "ordinary home mortgages." 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Is! Irvin D. Parker 
Administrator of 
Consumer Affairs 
Received as information. 
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